Moogie
06-12-2002, 10:38 AM
Not according to this article by: Physicist S. Fred Singer is emeritus
professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia and a
visiting Wesson Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
See the article here: Click (http://www.sepp.org/NewSEPP/Nuclear-Terrorism.htm)
He also gets some shots in at the "Green" movement and the media.
Interesting reading. Let me know what you think.
======================================
Nuclear terrorism: facts and fantasies
S. Fred Singer (in Wash Times April 5, 2002)
Following the attacks of Sept. 11, there has been much concern about further acts of terrorism, with nuclear terrorism heading the list. For some reason, the public seems to be more afraid of radioactivity than poison gas or even biological agents. This in spite of the fact that radioactivity is easy to detect, rarely lethal, and cannot cause epidemics like viruses or bacteria. This fear is being exploited by opponents of nuclear power who keep coming up with a multitude of scary scenarios.
Three general types of nuclear terrorism are much in the news: One is the so-called "dirty" bomb, which does not create but simply disperses radioactive material, packed around conventional explosives. Another concern is release of radioactivity from an aircraft impact or the internal sabotage of an operating nuclear reactor or of storage of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel. [Green activists, who would love to shut down reactors, assiduously promote this particular fear.] Finally, we have the possible explosion of a nuclear bomb. Of the three, the dirty bomb makes no sense at all; impact or sabotage is extremely unlikely to succeed. Only a real nuclear bomb using fissionable uranium or plutonium poses a serious threat, but even there countermeasures can be taken.
The dirty bomb is mostly hype. A report based on a three-year study by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements claimed that contamination from such an attack would likely extend to several city blocks and that radiation would be "catastrophic but manageable." However, quite simple considerations show that such a bomb is merely a terror weapon without teeth; it would cause panic but it does not kill. And media stories promote such panic since the public fears anything that's even remotely connected with radioactivity.
To combat panic, we need to understand a little more about radioactivity. We need to know what kind of radioactivity is involved and its lifetime -- how long it lasts before it fades away.
The three kinds of radioactivity, conventionally labeled as alpha, beta and gamma, are quite different from one another and require different countermeasures. Alpha activity is generally innocuous; alpha particles (high-speed nuclei of helium atoms) have a very limited range, at most a few inches in the air, and can be stopped by a sheet of paper or by the skin. Atoms emitting alpha particles are dangerous only if inhaled into the lungs or ingested through food. The standard counter is to avoid eating contaminated food, decontaminate buildings and other spaces, and protect against inhalation by using ordinary facemasks worn against industrial dust and other kinds of pollution.
Beta particles are electrons moving at speeds close to that of light. While they are generally more penetrating than the more massive alphas, they present no problem unless their intensity is so high that the cumulative radiation dose becomes important. Gamma rays are massless and move at the speed of light; they are like x-rays, except more energetic and penetrating. Again, it is the intensity that matters -- compared with the natural background radiation from cosmic rays and the radioactive emissions from earth rocks. Even our bodies are naturally radioactive. The additional radiation dose would have to exceed 100 times that of the normal background before health effects could appear. Remember that every time you fly in the stratosphere you experience radiation levels up to ten times higher than those at the surface.
The lifetime of radiation is also important. We usually talk about "half-life," the time over which the radiation intensity drops by a factor of two. If the half-life is a week, then after one week the level has dropped to 50 percent, after two weeks by a factor of four, to 25 percent, by three weeks by a factor of eight, and so on. Anyone constructing a dirty bomb would choose radioactive nuclei with a half-life of days or weeks. If much shorter, say seconds, the activity would fade away before the bomb is assembled. If the half-life is much longer, say decades or even longer, the level of radioactivity would be extremely low in relation to the total amount of material assembled. But with a half-life measured in hours or longer, one could simply walk out of the contaminated region, preferably heading upwind, before accumulating a harmful dose of radiation.]
A dirty bomb makes no practical sense. To produce significant radioactivity over an area of, say, one square mile, the concentration within a small bomb would have to be roughly 10 million times greater and would quickly kill the terrorists trying to assemble the material. The radioactivity also creates large amounts of heat energy, sufficient to melt most containers. What's more, any such bomb would be easy to detect at long distance if it emits gamma rays. We therefore conclude that a dirty bomb is mostly hype.
Similarly, damaging a nuclear reactor by impact or by sabotage is unrealistic. As compared to the World Trade Center towers, a reactor presents a very small target that is difficult to hit. Furthermore, it is protected by at least three feet of reinforced concrete, which even a large plane is unlikely to penetrate. On top of all that, it is easy to guard against impact with strategically placed steel towers or steel cables that would break up any aircraft. While they may not stop the plane's engines, the fuel will be spilled before the reactor is hit. The same kind of protection can be provided for the nearby storage silos of spent fuel, which is also enclosed with thick concrete.
A ground attack is also unlikely to succeed. Even if terrorists could penetrate the normal security barriers, they would find that the control personnel had shut down the reactor. Turning it off can be done quickly. And even if a meltdown could be produced, the thick concrete containment structure prevents the escape of radioactivity into the environment. Chernobyl had no such containment.
In the extremely unlikely event of a total reactor accident, the consequences are less severe than generally pictured. We have already seen the worst scenario that one can imagine: Even so, Chernobyl killed only some 30 people -- those who were directly involved in putting out the fire. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the subsequent health effects have been minor: no increases in leukemia or birth defects; only cases of thyroid cancer that could have been avoided by taking protective potassium-iodide pills. Certainly, more people died from the panicky reaction to Chernobyl, including thousands of abortions by women in Western Europe who feared the consequences from the release of radiation.
We are left then with the only serious threat: nuclear bombs delivered by ships or even suitcases. But constructing and exploding a nuclear bomb is not a job for amateurs. It requires an infrastructure that can only be provided by a government. Even if the bomb is stolen, it must come from the arsenal of a known national government.
The outstanding technical problems are detection of fissile bomb material by remote sensing and establishing the provenance of the bomb for purposes of retaliation. Both are feasible and - I hope - being worked on. By announcing that we have, or are close to, solutions to these two problems we might achieve a measure of deterrence.
In addition, we must have good intelligence and apply vigilance, diplomatic pressure, military threats of retaliation, and even pre-emption. But that's why we elect national leaders and invest in national defense.
****************************************************************************************
Physicist S. Fred Singer is emeritus professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia and a visiting Wesson Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
singer@sepp.org tel 703/920 2744
professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia and a
visiting Wesson Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
See the article here: Click (http://www.sepp.org/NewSEPP/Nuclear-Terrorism.htm)
He also gets some shots in at the "Green" movement and the media.
Interesting reading. Let me know what you think.
======================================
Nuclear terrorism: facts and fantasies
S. Fred Singer (in Wash Times April 5, 2002)
Following the attacks of Sept. 11, there has been much concern about further acts of terrorism, with nuclear terrorism heading the list. For some reason, the public seems to be more afraid of radioactivity than poison gas or even biological agents. This in spite of the fact that radioactivity is easy to detect, rarely lethal, and cannot cause epidemics like viruses or bacteria. This fear is being exploited by opponents of nuclear power who keep coming up with a multitude of scary scenarios.
Three general types of nuclear terrorism are much in the news: One is the so-called "dirty" bomb, which does not create but simply disperses radioactive material, packed around conventional explosives. Another concern is release of radioactivity from an aircraft impact or the internal sabotage of an operating nuclear reactor or of storage of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel. [Green activists, who would love to shut down reactors, assiduously promote this particular fear.] Finally, we have the possible explosion of a nuclear bomb. Of the three, the dirty bomb makes no sense at all; impact or sabotage is extremely unlikely to succeed. Only a real nuclear bomb using fissionable uranium or plutonium poses a serious threat, but even there countermeasures can be taken.
The dirty bomb is mostly hype. A report based on a three-year study by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements claimed that contamination from such an attack would likely extend to several city blocks and that radiation would be "catastrophic but manageable." However, quite simple considerations show that such a bomb is merely a terror weapon without teeth; it would cause panic but it does not kill. And media stories promote such panic since the public fears anything that's even remotely connected with radioactivity.
To combat panic, we need to understand a little more about radioactivity. We need to know what kind of radioactivity is involved and its lifetime -- how long it lasts before it fades away.
The three kinds of radioactivity, conventionally labeled as alpha, beta and gamma, are quite different from one another and require different countermeasures. Alpha activity is generally innocuous; alpha particles (high-speed nuclei of helium atoms) have a very limited range, at most a few inches in the air, and can be stopped by a sheet of paper or by the skin. Atoms emitting alpha particles are dangerous only if inhaled into the lungs or ingested through food. The standard counter is to avoid eating contaminated food, decontaminate buildings and other spaces, and protect against inhalation by using ordinary facemasks worn against industrial dust and other kinds of pollution.
Beta particles are electrons moving at speeds close to that of light. While they are generally more penetrating than the more massive alphas, they present no problem unless their intensity is so high that the cumulative radiation dose becomes important. Gamma rays are massless and move at the speed of light; they are like x-rays, except more energetic and penetrating. Again, it is the intensity that matters -- compared with the natural background radiation from cosmic rays and the radioactive emissions from earth rocks. Even our bodies are naturally radioactive. The additional radiation dose would have to exceed 100 times that of the normal background before health effects could appear. Remember that every time you fly in the stratosphere you experience radiation levels up to ten times higher than those at the surface.
The lifetime of radiation is also important. We usually talk about "half-life," the time over which the radiation intensity drops by a factor of two. If the half-life is a week, then after one week the level has dropped to 50 percent, after two weeks by a factor of four, to 25 percent, by three weeks by a factor of eight, and so on. Anyone constructing a dirty bomb would choose radioactive nuclei with a half-life of days or weeks. If much shorter, say seconds, the activity would fade away before the bomb is assembled. If the half-life is much longer, say decades or even longer, the level of radioactivity would be extremely low in relation to the total amount of material assembled. But with a half-life measured in hours or longer, one could simply walk out of the contaminated region, preferably heading upwind, before accumulating a harmful dose of radiation.]
A dirty bomb makes no practical sense. To produce significant radioactivity over an area of, say, one square mile, the concentration within a small bomb would have to be roughly 10 million times greater and would quickly kill the terrorists trying to assemble the material. The radioactivity also creates large amounts of heat energy, sufficient to melt most containers. What's more, any such bomb would be easy to detect at long distance if it emits gamma rays. We therefore conclude that a dirty bomb is mostly hype.
Similarly, damaging a nuclear reactor by impact or by sabotage is unrealistic. As compared to the World Trade Center towers, a reactor presents a very small target that is difficult to hit. Furthermore, it is protected by at least three feet of reinforced concrete, which even a large plane is unlikely to penetrate. On top of all that, it is easy to guard against impact with strategically placed steel towers or steel cables that would break up any aircraft. While they may not stop the plane's engines, the fuel will be spilled before the reactor is hit. The same kind of protection can be provided for the nearby storage silos of spent fuel, which is also enclosed with thick concrete.
A ground attack is also unlikely to succeed. Even if terrorists could penetrate the normal security barriers, they would find that the control personnel had shut down the reactor. Turning it off can be done quickly. And even if a meltdown could be produced, the thick concrete containment structure prevents the escape of radioactivity into the environment. Chernobyl had no such containment.
In the extremely unlikely event of a total reactor accident, the consequences are less severe than generally pictured. We have already seen the worst scenario that one can imagine: Even so, Chernobyl killed only some 30 people -- those who were directly involved in putting out the fire. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the subsequent health effects have been minor: no increases in leukemia or birth defects; only cases of thyroid cancer that could have been avoided by taking protective potassium-iodide pills. Certainly, more people died from the panicky reaction to Chernobyl, including thousands of abortions by women in Western Europe who feared the consequences from the release of radiation.
We are left then with the only serious threat: nuclear bombs delivered by ships or even suitcases. But constructing and exploding a nuclear bomb is not a job for amateurs. It requires an infrastructure that can only be provided by a government. Even if the bomb is stolen, it must come from the arsenal of a known national government.
The outstanding technical problems are detection of fissile bomb material by remote sensing and establishing the provenance of the bomb for purposes of retaliation. Both are feasible and - I hope - being worked on. By announcing that we have, or are close to, solutions to these two problems we might achieve a measure of deterrence.
In addition, we must have good intelligence and apply vigilance, diplomatic pressure, military threats of retaliation, and even pre-emption. But that's why we elect national leaders and invest in national defense.
****************************************************************************************
Physicist S. Fred Singer is emeritus professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia and a visiting Wesson Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
singer@sepp.org tel 703/920 2744